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How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as
a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object?
This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five
decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof
system that can validate the structure and composition of an object,
such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing
either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic
method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic
makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting
information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not
rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined
with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that
could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent
sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times.
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The United States and Russia together retain more than 10,000nuclear weapons, of which about 5,500 are currently desig-
nated to be removed from the stockpile (1). More designations are
expected in the future: The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty requires both countries to reduce to a maximum of 1,550
deployed warheads each by February 2018, and the most recent
US Nuclear Posture Review states, “The United States and Russia
have deeply reduced their nuclear forces from Cold War levels,
but both still retain many more nuclear weapons than needed” (2).
The treaties behind arms reductions typically require verification
measures to assure compliance with obligations. However, despite
nearly five decades of research by US and Russian laboratories, no
method for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads with-
out unacceptable intrusiveness has been found. In the absence of a
solution, past arms-control treaties have verified the dismantlement
of delivery systems instead, an effective substitute provided the
majority of nuclear forces are deployed in dedicated systems. Direct
verification of nondeployed warheads will ultimately be needed to
certify warhead destruction, which is critical to reducing their in-
fluence on the strategic calculus and the risk of theft.
Attempts to verify warhead dismantlement began with Project
Cloud Gap in 1963 (3). This and subsequent approaches were built
upon traditional assay methods, but it was soon discovered that
even very invasive techniques could be readily defeated with a
hoax, whereas the least invasive methods still revealed classified
design information (4–6). As a result, proposals for verifying war-
heads grew progressively less intrusive. The epistemology of cer-
tainty came to be defined, not in mathematical terms, but by a view
that human interactions during verification could create confi-
dence. In an acknowledgment of the seemingly intractable confi-
dence–secrecy tradeoff, a high-level scientific review panel stated
that verification “will of necessity be less than perfect,” and “must
rely on difficult political/strategic judgments” (4). History has shown,
however, that staking the verification of controversial arms-control
agreements on trust has led to outsized fears of cheating that can
facilitate a failure to ratify treaties in national legislatures (7, 8). A
rigorous approach to warhead verification is therefore desirable if it
can simultaneously satisfy secrecy requirements.
In an attempt to solve this dilemma, information barriers were
introduced in the 1990s. These are software programs that analyze
measured attributes of warheads while hiding data from human
inspectors (5, 6, 9). In principle, the information barrier would allow
for more intrusive measurements while still protecting secrets. It
was later recognized that this approach merely shifted the challenge
of protecting classified information into the electronic domain:
Potentially undiscovered backdoors, encryption vulnerabilities, or
hardware flaws could allow classified information to leak through
the barrier. Integrity suffered as well: Trapdoor functionalities could
be designed into the system to pass specially made hoax objects as if
they were authentic warheads (5). The sensitivity of measurements
also suffered because secrecy requirements forced measurement
objectives to be so loosely defined that cheating became trivial.
Whereas work on electronic information barriers continues, there is
at present no accepted method for proving the absence of vulner-
abilities in an electronic system, nor has a necessary and sufficient
test of authenticity been defined (10).
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Warhead
Verification
To prove a statement requires a system that is complete, meaning
the system must be capable of proving that any true warhead is true;
and the system must be sound, meaning the system must reject
all hoax warheads as false (11). The politics of warhead verification
imposes a third requirement, that there be zero disclosure of
sensitive information, either measured directly or inferable by
statistical reconstructions.
Because “warheadness” is not a physically measurable property, a
special axiom must be constructed to bridge from the domain of
physical measurements to statements about authenticity. Although
such axioms are rarely made explicit, the strength of any verification
system hangs on the veracity of this axiom. We adopt the following:
If every manifold (a connected logical body) in a candidate warhead
is identical (within allowed tolerances) in size, shape, spatial relation,
density, and isotopic composition to a corresponding manifold in an
authentic warhead, then the candidate warhead is authentic.
This is not a perfect bridge axiom because it is insensitive to mi-
crostructure, such as grain size in metals, surface polish, bonding
interfaces, and chemical isomers with identical densities. Variations
Significance
We provide a method for potentially solving one of the central
problems in arms control: proving the authenticity of a nuclear
warhead without revealing information about its construction. The
proposal is the first, to our knowledge, to be proof-theoretically
sound (i.e., unspoofable) and information-theoretically secure. The
method uses a tomography techniquewhich can resolve the spatial
distribution of mass with isotopic specificity. The soundness and
security emerge from an integral-geometric transform that is
able to uniquely map 3D geometries from zero-dimensional
point measurements.
Author contributions: R.S.K., A.D., R.R.M., and J.R.V. designed research, performed research,
analyzed data, and wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
Freely available online through the PNAS open access option.
1R.S.K., A.D., R.R.M., and J.R.V. contributed equally to this work.
2To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: rsk@mit.edu.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.
1073/pnas.1603916113/-/DCSupplemental.
8618–8623 | PNAS | August 2, 2016 | vol. 113 | no. 31 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1603916113
in these properties can affect warhead function, and in principle it
would be desirable to validate all these properties during the veri-
fication process. However, we suggest that a hoax warhead that was
manufactured to be identical in isotopic composition and geometry
to a real warhead, but which deviated only by some microstructural
property, would be so nearly difficult to manufacture as a real
warhead that it would not be a valuable cheating strategy. As such,
this axiom provides in our estimation a sufficient test of authenticity.
A physical test able to satisfy the axiom is nontrivial. It must be
capable of mapping the spatial distribution of every isotope of in-
terest in the warhead: in essence, an isotopic tomogram is required.
This work introduces a method for making such a tomogram.
Concept and Protocol
We extend the previously proposed template approach to veri-
fication, whereby a candidate warhead is compared with a known-
authentic warhead called a template. To verify that the candidate
is essentially identical to the template, we propose to radiograph
both objects at a set of identical but randomly chosen orientations.
Unlike a traditional imaging radiograph, the process uses a single-
pixel detector that cannot resolve spatial details but nonetheless
ensures the entire 3D geometry matches with high confidence. Si-
multaneously, reconstruction of warhead composition and geome-
try is prevented by scattering “foils” that serve as physical analogs to
encryption keys. The overall interaction would proceed as follows:
i) A template warhead is established by a joint exercise be-
tween the host (the country offering candidate warheads
for verification) and the inspector.
ii) The host submits additional candidate warheads to be tested
into joint custody.
iii) The host installs an encrypting foil into the measurement
apparatus (Fig. 1). The foil acts as a physical secret key that
protects classified information during a measurement.
iv) The inspector supervises tomographic measurements of the
template and candidate according to randomized parame-
ters of the inspector’s choosing. Inspector’s choice renders
cheating impractical for the host.
v) Although the measured data are physically encrypted, if the
candidate-warhead data match the template-warhead data,
then the inspector has very high confidence the candidate
warhead is a physical copy of the template warhead.
In our system, a template is an actual nuclear warhead. One
template must be established for each warhead design being dis-
mantled. The template must inherit the presumption of authenticity
by a mechanism acceptable to the inspector. It has been previously
suggested that the authenticity of a template might derive from its
situational context (6). For example, a template warhead could be
chosen at random from the fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Because a country’s nuclear deterrent hinges on the presence of real
warheads on its missiles, the randomly selected warhead is very likely
to be real. Other mechanisms, such as a credible record of custody,
could be used to establish the authenticity of a nondeployed warhead
template. Because the proposed technique hinges on the authenticity
of the template, it should be recognized that any uncertainties as-
sociated with it are transferred to all verified items. The method by
which one selects a template is therefore of crucial importance and
deserves additional study.
Measurement
The measurement consists of a series of projections that can be
used to create a tomogram of the warhead’s geometry. Each pro-
jection is based on transmission nuclear-resonance fluorescence,
which allows the system to resolve the geometric distribution of
each isotope independently.
The measurement apparatus is illustrated in Fig. 1. A high-energy
X-ray beam (2–9 MeV) passes through the object being tested.
An ideal beam would be monoenergetic, such as produced by a laser
Compton light source, as it greatly simplifies the proof of information
security (12). In this paper, we simulate a bremsstrahlung X-ray
source producing a wide continuum of photon energies, which is a
more practical and affordable alternative, but one that requires the
imposition of additional constraints to ensure information security.
Bremsstrahlung will also give measured objects a significantly greater
radiation dose, the implications of which would need to be evaluated
by the host.
Nuclei in the test object will resonantly absorb photons from
the interrogating beam if the photon energy matches an allowed
transition of the nucleus. The widths of these absorption reso-
nances are ∼1 eV FWHM and are described by a Doppler-
broadened Breit–Wigner formulation (13). Most of the resonances
are ∼10 keV or more apart, with the energies of each res-
onance being unique to each isotope. The sparseness of these
resonances (visible in Fig. 2) prevents isotopic confusion,
whereas the uniqueness of the resonant energy provides a one-
to-one mapping between energy and the identity of the material.
As the beam traverses the test object, the resonant absorption
of photons acts like a filter. The flux of photons at a nuclear-resonant
energy is depleted in proportion to the amount of that isotope pre-
sent, creating narrow absorption lines in the spectrum of the trans-
mitted beam. The position and depth of these notches depends on
the integrated density of each isotope along the path of the beam. By
rotating the warhead and taking projections at different angles, the
internal geometry of the warhead can be tomographically sampled.
The transmitted beam is not measured directly. Instead, the
transmitted beam is incident upon a packet of thin foils, through
which the large majority of the beam’s X-rays will pass into a
beam dump. However, a subset of photons that have passed
through the warhead will still be at nuclei-resonant energies. If a
resonant isotope is present in the foil packet, the on-resonance
photons will now be absorbed by foil nuclei, exciting the nuclei
into short-lived states. The excited nuclei of the foil rapidly decay
(typically in < 1ps), emitting characteristic gammas in all direc-
tions, a process known as nuclear-resonance fluorescence (NRF).
The rate at which these gammas are emitted depends on the
fluence remaining in the beam leaving the warhead that is incident
upon the foil, and on the areal thickness of the isotope in the foil
(Eq. 1). It is this fluorescent signature of the foil that is measured
with detectors. Because there is no other process in materials that
can mimic these characteristic gammas, we believe cheating by
material substitution to be impossible. This might not be the case
for other nuclear and atomic processes, such as neutron scattering,
for which combinations of materials can be made to simulate the
behavior of a specific isotope.
Fig. 1. Schematic of measurement apparatus. TAI is the treaty accountable
item, either the template nuclear warhead or candidate warhead and its
packaging.
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Theory of a Single Projection. The spectral exitance (photons
emitted per unit energy per unit surface area) MðE,wÞ from
some point w on the foil is closely described by Eq. 1. The in-
tegral term represents the projection made when the beam flux
passes through the object, which is described by a 3D density
map ρobj,iðr+ sθÞ of the object for each isotope i. The integral
runs through the object along a ray r+ θ= rw connecting the
X-ray source at point r to a point w on the foil along some di-
rection vector θ, the length of which is parameterized by s. The rate
of photon attenuation depends on the NRF cross-section σ   NRF,i for
isotope i at energy E. The second bracketed term describes the
response of the encrypting foil based on the foil’s composition as
described by the density ρfoil,iðwÞ of isotope i at point w, and its
effective thickness zi (SI Appendix, Eq. S10c).
MðE,wÞ≈ϕoAnrexp
"X
i

−σ   NRF,i
Z
rw
ρ  obj,iðr+ sθÞ  ds
#
×
"
1− exp
 X
i
−σ   NRF,i   ρ  foil,iðwÞzi
!#
.
[1]
Note that the spectrum of photons exiting from the foil is a
function of both ρobj,i and ρfoil,i. By changing the object being
measured (ρobj) but holding the foil (ρfoil) constant, the inspector
can compare two measurements of M to determine whether the
projection for a candidate warhead is identical to the same
projection for a template warhead. Note that it is impossible to
solve for the sensitive information in ρobj without knowledge of
ρfoil. Because the host can provide the foil without revealing its
isotopic composition to the inspector, the vector of isotopes in
the foil acts like a one-time-pad encryption key that prevents the
inspector from learning the warhead’s composition. Although
the inspector does not know the amount of each isotope in the
foil, each of which can vary by orders of magnitude, the inspector
can still be certain that the foil is sensitive to each isotope of
interest, for if the foil lacks a sufficient amount of an isotope, the
corresponding fluorescence signal will not be adequately ob-
served within the agreed measurement duration. In this respect,
the foil is self-validating. The foil’s gamma fluorescence can be
measured using high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors.
Placing the detectors in shielded cavities that view the surface of
the foil packet from angles that are large (typically >135°) rela-
tive to the beam direction will minimize the background flux
from nonresonant processes in the foil, such as secondary brems-
strahlung, multiple Compton scatters, and X-ray fluorescence
(XRF). The information security aspects of these non-NRF pro-
cesses are discussed below.
Simulating a Single Projection. A measurement was simulated us-
ing the Geant4 Monte Carlo simulation toolkit with the G4NRF
NRF-physics package (14, 15), which tracks each photon and its
interaction daughters through the warhead, foil, and detector ge-
ometries and simulates all relevant photon interactions in these
materials. The test objects were illuminated with a pencil beam of
bremsstrahlung X-rays. A total of 8× 1011 photons with a 2.7-MeV
endpoint bremsstrahlung energy distribution was incident on each
test object (SI Appendix, section 5.1). The template-warhead
(Table 1) model is loosely based on approximate Soviet design
information revealed during the Black Sea experiment, taking the
median estimate for the thicknesses of weapons-grade plutonium,
high-explosive, and highly enriched uranium; and applying the
simplifying assumption that these materials are arranged as con-
centric spherical shells (16). The result is an object with the correct
materials in approximately the correct quantities; it does not re-
flect the design of a real warhead.
The photons emitted from the encrypting foil at angles >135°
from the forward-going beam are tallied. The resulting full-
spectrum histogram as seen by the detector is shown in Fig. 2.
For the simulation, the “foil” used was 2 cm thick and made from
equal parts by mass 235U, 238U, 239Pu, and 240Pu, at a homogeneous
overall density of 19 g/cm3. This choice was made strictly to con-
serve computational time. In a practical environment, the foil would
be thinner, varying from micrometers to centimeters, providing
about 4 orders of magnitude in dynamic range while staying within
reasonable measurement times (SI Appendix, section 5.4). This
dynamic range is what allows the foil to perform a meaningful
encrypting function.
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Black Sea warhead template spectrum
Fig. 2. Geant4 simulation of the spectrum generated
by the Black Sea warhead and an encrypting foil, at
1 keV per bin. The spectrum represents the combined
output of 30 idealized HPGe detectors placed at the
distance of 1 m from the foil, using bremsstrahlung
generated by a 4-mA 2.7-MeV electron beam and an
exposure time of 21 s. The low-energy continuum is
primarily the result of charged particles in the foil
creating secondary bremsstrahlung.
Table 1. Assumed parameters for the Black Sea warhead template
Material name and isotopic composition Density, g/cm3 Inner radius, cm Outer radius, cm
Weapon-grade plutonium (WGPu): 94% Pu-239, 6% Pu-240 19.84 6.27 6.7
HMX high explosive: 3% H, 16% C, 38% N, 43% O 1.89 6.7 13.2
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): 95% U-235, 5% U-238 18.7 13.2 13.45
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Tomographic Uniqueness from Projections. The bridge axiom be-
tween observables and the conclusion of authenticity requires
more than a statement about integrated densities along a single
line of projection; it requires that all of the materials in the candidate
object be identically distributed to those in the template object. The
internal geometry must be somehow sampled to satisfy the bridge
axiom, otherwise the system admits the possibility of a geometric
hoax, an object that has all of the correct materials and is able to
elicit the same NRF spectrum, but with a different geometric con-
figuration. Such a hoax is illustrated in SI Appendix, Fig. S5.
The projection-slice theorem, which underpins tomographic im-
aging, holds that all 3D manifolds can be uniquely mapped from an
infinite set of 2D projections, although a finite set of projections is
usually adequate in practice (17). However, projection images of
this type would reveal classified information about the warhead’s
structure, such as the diameter of the plutonium pit. To avoid this
problem, we limit the system to a uniform foil that operates as
a single-pixel camera with zero spatial-dimension sensitivity.
However, this presents a challenge: the mathematical formalism for
tomographic imaging from dimensionless single-pixel images has
not been previously developed.
We devised an integral transform that is able to uniquely map
a 3D geometry from a set of zero-dimensional projections of the
type made by the single-pixel camera (SI Appendix, section 2).
This transform is shown in Eq. 2.
Kρobjðr, θÞ≡
Z
S2
exp

−
Z
ρobjðr+ sθÞ  ds

  dθ
∝
Z
foil
MðE,wÞ  dw,
[2]
where ρobjðr+ sθÞ is the density along the ray r+ θ running
through the object being mapped. The exterior integral runs over
the entire 2D projection space S2, collapsing the 2D image into a
scalar value—the same process as occurs in a single-pixel camera
when the detector integrates photons from the entire foil. The
inner integral over ds is the X-ray transform used in conventional
tomography. The transform is unique and invertible for any object
ρobj, which implies that any difference in the candidate object’s
structure can be resolved and no two structures will produce the
same transform signal (see proof in SI Appendix, section 2.2).
Although no inversion formula has been identified for the K trans-
form, the inversion formula is not needed as the candidate and
template geometries can be compared in the transform space.
Soundness Under Limited Sampling. Perfect soundness in tomo-
graphic systems is only guaranteed for infinite projections; for
any finite number there arises the possibility that variations in
the object may go undetected. These undetectable differences are
called ghosts. Physically, ghosts can be thought of as a map of
density variations that coincide spatially with ρobj, consisting of both
positive and negative density-change values. A map g is a ghost if it
has the property Kðρobj + gÞ=KðρobjÞ for all projections consid-
ered. The objects h= ρobj + g for each valid g constitute the com-
plete set of all possible geometric hoax objects that are not the
same as the authentic weapon, but which the system is unable to
reject as mismatched. It has been shown that a smooth, continuous,
and nontrivial g can be constructed for any finite set of projections
(18). If one of the corresponding geometric hoaxes (h) can be
practically manufactured, the system can be cheated.
Louis and Törnig showed that for the Radon transform, ghost
functions on the unit disk can be described as a superposition of
orthogonal Zernike polynomials (19). Importantly, the lowest-order
polynomial in the set must have order H equal to or greater than
the number of projections N (19). Therefore, whereas ghosts ca-
pable of spoofing the system always exist, ifN is large the ghosts and
corresponding hoax objects h will be highly oscillatory, geometri-
cally complex, and eventually more difficult to manufacture than a
true warhead. To illustrate this, example ghost functions with order
H = 15 and H = 78 are shown in Fig. 3. Whereas it is impractical to
test for the absence of all ghost objects, one can eliminate to an
arbitrarily high level of confidence all of the low-order hoaxes that
constitute the set of strategically useful cheats.
It is not necessary to measure N >H projections to rule out all
ghosts of polynomial order H. It is sufficient if the system can
resolve N >H projections and then sample only a few randomly
selected projections. For a projection system limited to spheri-
cal rotations of the test object, the number of distinct projec-
tions can be approximated by the solid angle of circular cones as
N ≈ 2=ð1− cos δθÞ, where δθ is the effective angular resolution of
the system. For example, a system able to resolve rotations of
δθ= 10° has N ≈ 132 distinct projections. Given a system able to
resolve N distinct projections, the probability that a hoax of min-
imum polynomial order H survives undetected by the system after
k trials of randomly selected projections is bounded by Eq. 3.
B≤
Yk
j=1

ð1− αÞH
N
+ βj

1−
H
N

, [3]
where α is the probability of erroneously rejecting a projection of
a true warhead (type I error) because of statistical fluctuations,
and βj is the probability of failing to reject a nonmatching pro-
jection of a hoax because it could not be statistically differenti-
ated from a matching projection (type II error) (SI Appendix,
section 6.2). Note that βj is specific to each hoax and projection,
but in general it will increase as the hoax becomes more sophis-
ticated in design, which also implies increasing H, and can be
decreased by increasing measurement times, which also increases
the number of resolvable projections N.
Sensitivity to Hoax Objects
Hoax objects were simulated to demonstrate the system’s ability
to detect several commonly suggested cheating scenarios:
i) Material replacement with a surrogate of similar density and
atomic number. This type of hoax can spoof conventional
X-ray and transmission-neutron measurements. In the ex-
ample case, plutonium is replaced by depleted uranium.
ii) Replacing a material with another of the same element but with
different isotopic ratios. In the example case, weapon-grade
Fig. 3. Two-dimensional Zernike polynomials on
the unit disk showing density modulations in a pla-
nar cross-section characteristic of a hoax that is able
to be assured of escaping detection for 15 and 78
projections, respectively.
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plutonium (WGPu) with 6% 240Pu is replaced by fuel-grade
plutonium (FGPu) with 14% 240Pu.
iii) A geometric hoax designed to produce a spectrogram that
matches the authentic object by arranging the correct mate-
rials in a nonwarhead geometry. In the example case, the
hoax is a series of slabs that is able to confuse the system at
two collinear angles of projection ðH = 2Þ.
Measurements from each cheating scenario are compared with the
measurement of an authentic template. A simple statistical test was
used in which the photon counts in four energy bins are compared,
each corresponding to an NRF transition for an isotope of interest.
Test Thresholds. The discrepancy between the counts for
energy bin i and projection j can be restated in SDs as
Δi,j = ðccan,i,j − ctem,i,jÞ=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2can,i,j + σ
2
tem,i,j
q
, where ccan,i,j and ctem,i,j
are the counts in bin i for the candidate and template, re-
spectively, and σ2can,i,j and σ
2
tem,i,j are their variances. The
decision rule used here is to alarm if the absolute differenceΔi,j for any of the chosen NRF bins exceeds the selected test
threshold Δt. The probability that a true matching projection is
rejected because of random fluctuation (the false-alarm rate) is
α= 1− ½ΦðΔtÞ−Φð−ΔtÞn, where n is the number of NRF bins
evaluated per projection and Φ is the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the normal distribution centered at zero with variance unity
(or cumulative Skellam distribution if total counts are small). For the
simulation examples below, Δt = 4.2σ and n= 4, giving α= 1× 10−4.
A more considered protocol might aim for a higher false-alarm rate
to intentionally exercise a procedure for occasionally retesting au-
thentic weapons. This would minimize the political repercussions of a
false alarm if an innocent mistake had been made, while simulta-
neously improving the probability of detecting a genuine hoax object.
With the alarm threshold chosen, the probability of failing
to detect an unmatched projection can be estimated as βj =
min
∀i
ðΦðΔt −
Δi,jÞÞ, where Δi,j are now the discrepancies in the
units of SD for a particular hoax, at projection j, and NRF bin
i. Values of βj are reported for each hoax in Table 2. If the
object is sampled at multiple projections, then the overall system
probability of failing to reject a hoax after all k projections is B, and
is bounded by Eq. 3, where N and H are functions of the mea-
surement time and the quality of the hoax, respectively. Note that
the system is able to perform to arbitrarily high levels of accuracy
for any hoax by measuring for an increased amount of time or by
increasing the number of projections k.
Simulation Results for a Practical System. The results in Table 2
show what could be achieved with a practical system built using
commercial off-the-shelf components: the Ion-Beam Applica-
tions Ltd. TT100 Rhodotron (an electron accelerator with beam
energy adjustable up to 10 MeV at 4 mA; higher current models
are also made), and an array of 30 idealized HPGe detectors
[having 20% intrinsic efficiency for 2-MeV photons, better
known as “100%” detectors based on their performance relative
to the ANSI/IEEE-325–1996 standard for NaI (20); see also SI
Appendix, section 8.3]. The results indicate that the described
technique is able to reject all of the posited material-substitution
hoaxes with greater than 99.9% probability in a 21-s measure-
ment. See SI Appendix, section 5.4 on scaling to thinner foils.
To make a statement about the probability of detecting a geo-
metric hoax, some estimate of the system’s performance under
random rotations of the hoax is required. A simulation was per-
formed for a 10° rotation of a geometric hoax of polynomial order
H = 2 and achieving β10° = 6.82× 10−7 for one projection. This
indicates it is conservative to assume that a δθ= 10° rotation
constitutes the smallest statistically discernible change in pro-
jection possible. Rotation through a larger angle would lead to a
smaller βj, which implies βj ≤ β10° for the H = 2 hoax when the
system is restricted to a 10° minimum rotation. Under this as-
sumption, and restricting projections to rotations around the unit
sphere, N ≈ 2=ð1− cos δθÞ= 132. Using Eq. 3, we can then bound
the probability of cheating the example system with an H = 2 hoax
after one, two, and three 21-s measurements at random angles as
being less than 0.0152, 2.30× 10−4, and 3.48× 10−7, respectively.
Information Security
Eq. 1 states that, given a single NRF energy, the integrated
density for each isotope in the test object ðρobj,iÞ is impossible to
infer without knowledge of the foil’s composition. If the com-
position of the foil can be kept unknown to the inspector, then
the system is underconstrained and is provably secure for each
projection. A monochromatic photon source would selectively
excite individual NRF resonances, providing a way to ensure
that only one NRF transition is measured at a time. The corre-
sponding isotope in the foil can be assumed to vary from tens of
micrometers to centimeters, so in practice it is unknown only to
within several orders of magnitude, but this is more than ade-
quate to protect information about the warhead.
Although the foil’s composition is not disclosed to the in-
spector, it is also important to prevent the inspector from building a
credible statistical estimation of the foil. A foil should not be used
for multiple projections, as doing so may weaken its secrecy, just as
the multiple uses of a one-time pad can result in vulnerabilities.
However, our findings suggest that only a few geometric projections
will be necessary to achieve excellent rejection rates for possible hoax
objects, and one or two foil changes would not be an arduous task.
Even under monochromatic excitation, nonresonant processes
in the foil, namely secondary bremsstrahlung, multiple Compton
scatter, and XRF, may produce measurable signals in other en-
ergy bins. The first two, although easily forward modeled using
Monte Carlo simulations, have no closed-form expression. How-
ever, they are processes that are sensitive to the average elemental
compositions of the warhead and foil and can, therefore, be ren-
dered incapable of revealing information about the isotope of
Table 2. Detection potential for commonly suggested hoax objects for a single projection
Isotope
Difference in counts expressed in units of σ for select
NRF bins at 21 array-seconds
Probability of failing to
reject a hoax, βjU-238 U-235 Pu-239 Pu-240
Reference NRF line 2,176 keV 1,957 keV 2,431 keV 2,433 keV
Template vs. authentic* 1.41 0.454 1.47 1.69 —
Template vs. WGPu→ U-238 127 3.49 14.0 1.48 ∼0
Template vs. WGPu→ FGPu 3.75 1.93 1.49 7.16 7.89 × 10−4
Template vs. geometric hoax oriented to be undetectable 1.81 0.96 0.747 0.320 1 − α (by design)
Template vs. geometric hoax after 10° rotation 8.83 4.40 0.0796 0.964 6.82 × 10−7
*For comparison, a second authentic object was also simulated by using a different Monte Carlo random seed. The discrepancy in counts for the authentic
object and the matching geometric hoax are exaggerated by low simulation statistics (SI Appendix, section 5.3).
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interest by adding material to the foil that will modulate their re-
sponse independent of the isotope being examined. The third, XRF,
will reveal some information about concentration of specific ele-
ments in the foil, but a modest tungsten filter, as illustrated in Fig. 1,
will remove effectively all of the XRF photons before reaching the
germanium detectors. The germanium detectors should also be
separated from the warhead by heavy shielding so there is no
possibility of measuring other photons that come directly from
the warhead.
Much changes if a bremsstrahlung source is used. The ratios of
NRF peaks can facilitate estimation of the foil’s composition. The
host can compensate by adding additional unknowns to the system
(SI Appendix, section 7.1.2). Under bremsstrahlung illumination,
the information content of the nonresonant continuum would also
need to be examined for possible information content.
If the secret composition of the foil were somehow learned,
useful information about the weapon would still be protected
by the nonlinearity of the K transform. For example, with perfect
knowledge of the foil, the inspector can estimate the line integral
of the warhead’s isotopic density for a single projection, but the
nonlinearity of the transform ensures there is no one-to-one cor-
respondence between the line-integrated density and the mass. The
mass of an isotope can be recovered only if the inspector also
knows, or correctly guesses, the geometric distribution of relative
densities for the isotope in the warhead. The host can eliminate the
reliability of such guesses by using a technique described in SI
Appendix, section 7.1.3.
Finally, if an inspector can reliably and accurately discern the
composition of all secret foils used for each projection, if inversion
formula for the K transform is known, and if a large number of
different projections of a warhead are sampled, then the inspector
could discern the geometry of the warhead. However, our simu-
lations show that only one or two randomly selected projections
will be needed to achieve excellent rejection rates for the canonical
hoaxes examined here, suggesting the last requirement of many
projections need never be satisfied in a practical system.
Conclusions
Trends in nuclear disarmament indicate a need for a provably
sound, complete, and information-secure method for authenticating
nuclear warheads. The system proposed here seeks to meet these
requirements with a mathematically quantifiable physical frame-
work and logically sound set of axioms. By the virtue of being in the
public domain, various aspects of the system can be freely studied
and scrutinized by any participant in the arms reduction process. In
addition to theoretical considerations, there may be important op-
erational limitations to implementing such a system in existing
national-security environments, which will require further study
by government experts.
Soundness against strategically meaningful hoax warheads is
achieved by careful attention to the logical connections that link
observables to conclusions about warhead authenticity; by exploiting
a process in nuclear physics that acts as a naturally occurring one-
to-one function between energy and isotope identity; and through
the introduction of a single-pixel tomographic transform that pro-
vides a unique measure of the warhead’s geometry. Information is
protected by the intrinsic physics of the system rather than relying on
difficult-to-certify electronic circuits or software. Although electron-
ics are used to operate the detectors and to measure signals
leaving the shielded area, no sensitive information ever becomes
experimentally observable.
Simulations for a bremsstrahlung-based system using available
technologies and the simulated geometries suggest that two 21-s
measurements should be able to reject a canonical set of hoaxes
with greater than 99.9% probability, while falsely alarming on an
authentic warhead about once in every 10,000 warheads. Realistic
foil and warhead geometries will almost certainly require somewhat
longer measurements than those simulated. Work remains to val-
idate these simulations in an experimental setting. NRF cross-
section data for some isotopes, mainly those not used here, are still
sparse and may need to be measured if those isotopes are to be
included in the verification process.
If a bremsstrahlung beam is used, several information security
questions remain open. The information content of the contin-
uum underneath the NRF signal is at present poorly understood;
the simultaneous observation of multiple NRF transitions, which
is unavoidable with bremsstrahlung, will require careful study of
countermeasures to ensure the system remains underconstrained;
and dose to the warhead will be high when using bremsstrahlung.
Many of these problems can be avoided by using a tunable mono-
chromatic photon source.
Finally, although the example system suggests excellent per-
formance for canonical hoaxes and measurements on the order
of minutes, a relationship between measurement time and the
upper bound on the probability of failing to reject any possible
hoax would be a useful future development. As these probabil-
ities are inherently a function of hoax geometry, such a statement
requires a description of the space of all possible hoax objects,
which might first require the development of an inversion for-
mula for the K transform. This remains as future work.
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